Indonesian Journal of International Law
Volume 16

Number 2

Article 1

1-31-2019

Rule of Law with Asian Characteristics: cultural insights from the
Occupy Central Movement in Hong Kong
Jeffrey E. Thomas
University of Missouri - Kansas City School of Law, United States, thomasje@umkc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/ijil

Recommended Citation
Thomas, Jeffrey E. (2019) "Rule of Law with Asian Characteristics: cultural insights from the Occupy
Central Movement in Hong Kong," Indonesian Journal of International Law: Vol. 16 : No. 2 , Article 1.
DOI: 10.17304/ijil.vol16.2.747
Available at: https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/ijil/vol16/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UI Scholars Hub. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Indonesian Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of UI Scholars Hub.

Indonesian Journal of International Law (2019), Vol. 16 No. 2, pp. 137 - 168
http://dx.doi.org/10.17304/ijil.vol16.2.747

RULE OF LAW WITH ASIAN CHARACTERISTICS:
CULTURAL INSIGHTS FROM THE OCCUPY CENTRAL
MOVEMENT IN HONG KONG
Jeffrey E. Thomas*
* University of Missouri – Kansas City School of Law, United States
Correspondence: thomasje@umkc.edu
Abstract
This article uses the Occupy Central social movement in Hong Kong as a natural experiment
to consider whether Asian culture influences the understanding and exercise of fundamental
rights. In an earlier article, the author explored the relationship between Chinese culture and
the rule of law as measured by the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index. This article relies
on the earlier work, but expands the analysis to consider Asian culture while at the same time
focusing specifically on the fundamental rights aspect of the rule of law index. This article shows
a strong correlation between lower scores for Asian countries on Individualism, as measured by
the Hofstede Dimensions of Culture, and scores on fundamental rights, protection for freedom
expression, and protection for freedom of association, as measured by the World Justice Project
Index. This correlation is reflected by the Occupy Central movement. Although the movement
was an exercise in fundamental rights, its purpose was to promote the rights of the community
and the protests were carried out in a manner to reduce the impact on community rights When
the movement ended, the negative consequences for the community were a significant reason,
and the leaders of the movement were ultimately prosecuted for inciting a public nuisance.
Keywords: rule of law, culture, fundamental rights, freedom of expression, freedom of
association, occupy central
Submitted : 8 October 2018 | Revised : 23 December 2018 | Accepted : 10 January 2019

I. INTRODUCTION
In the Fall of 2014, citizens of Hong Kong participated in mass
protests about the selection process for Hong Kong’s Chief Executive.
These protests, known as “Occupy Central”1 were in part to support
Central is a designation for an area in the business district of Hong Kong. The social
movement that predated the mass protests in Central was known as “Occupy Central
with Love and Peace.” See Kin-man Chan, “Occupying Hong Kong: How deliberation, referendum and civil disobedience play out in the Umbrella Movement”, Sur
Journal, vol. 12, no. 21, August 2015, p. available at: https://sur.conectas.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07/Sur-21_Kin-man-Chan_en.pdf, accessed on 11 April 2019.
Some accounts use the full name of the movement, some use an abbreviation (OCLP),
some just refer to Occupy Central, and some refer to the Umbrella Movement. For this
article, the terms Occupy Central or the movement will be used to refer to the protests
by which several locations were occupied for an extended period. The title Occupy
Central with Love and Peace or the abbreviation OCLP will be used for the organized
1
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student protests and in reaction to police use of force against the students,
but they were also a manifestation of public support for a larger social
and political movement that had begun more than a year before. A large
number of people, including many, perhaps mostly, students, continued
the protest by occupying three areas in Hong Kong for 79 days. This
was a remarkable, unprecedented, social and political event in Hong
Kong. Protesters exercised their rights of expression and association
under the Hong Kong Basic Law in a significant and dramatic way.
This movement, with such robust and significant expression of
fundamental rights, presents a kind of natural experiment to consider
the relationship between culture and the fundamental rights that
are part of the rule of law. In prior work, the author has suggested
Chinese culture limits the development of rule of law.2 In particular,
the collectivist orientation in Chinese culture was found to reflect “a
cultural limitation on the protection of individual rights” such that
countries with Chinese culture “are unlikely to ever provide the level
of protection [for fundamental rights] afforded in individualistically
oriented countries.”3 Occupy Central provided an historical event to
evaluate the earlier finding. The analysis below will show that Occupy
Central, while being an expression of fundamental rights of freedom of
speech and association, also illustrates the limitation on those rights due
to a collectivist cultural tendency.
This article will begin with a description of rule of law data in
general, and the fundamental rights data and scores in particular, from
the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index. In the second section,
the article will use the work of the social psychologist Geert Hofsetde
to show the tendency of Asian culture to favor the community over
the individual. That tendency will then be compared to the rule of law
data for fundamental rights, and will show a correlation between a
preference for the individual and protection of fundamental rights. In
the third section, the article shows how the Occupy Central movement
reflects the cultural values for protection of the community. It will show
social movement that pre-dated the actual protests.
2
Jeffrey E. Thomas, “Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics: An Empirical Cultural Perspective on China, Hong Kong and Singapore”, Asia Pacific Law Review,
vol. 22, no. 1, 2014.
3
Ibid., p. 140.
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these values in the objectives of the movement, the procedures used
during the movement, and the reasons for concluding the occupation
and protests.
II. WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT RULE OF LAW INDEX
The World Justice Project is a non-profit organization that was
founded in 2006. Its goal “is to advance the rule of law around the
world.”4 In seeking to advance this goal, the World Justice Project
developed an index to perform a quantitative assessment of a country’s
adherence to rule of law.5 This assessment relies on data from a general
population poll and a questionnaire administered to legal experts in
each country.6 The 2019 index covers 126 countries and jurisdictions,
with data collected through more than 120,000 household surveys and
3,800 expert surveys.7 The index seeks to measure the rule of law as
it is practiced, not based on law “on the books,” and its surveys are
comprehensive, multi-dimensional and oriented to the perspective or
ordinary people.8
A country’s scores are built from 500 variables.9 General population
survey respondents answer “127 perception-based questions and 213
experience based questions.”10 The expert survey respondents are “incountry professionals with expertise in civil and commercial law, criminal
and constitutional law, labor law, and public health.”11 Expert surveys
include “close-ended perception questions and several hypothetical
scenarios with highly detailed factual assumptions aimed at ensuring
comparability across countries.”12 After cleaning the data by excluding
partial surveys, suspicious data, and outliers, survey responses are
“mapped onto the 44 sub-factors” or “onto the intermediate categories
4

Mark David Agrast, Juan Carlos Botero, Joel Martinez, Alejandro Ponce & Christine S.
Pratt, The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2012–2013, World Justice Project, available
at: https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/publications/rule-law-index-reports/wjp-rule-lawindex-2012-2013-report, accessed on 11 April 2019, p 1.

Ibid., p. 2.
Ibid. p. 1.
7
World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2019, World Justice Project, available
at: https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/publications/rule-law-index-reports/wjprule-law-index-2019, accessed on 16 March 2019, p. 5.
8
Ibid., p. 8.
9
Ibid., p. 161.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
5
6
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that make up each sub-factor.”13 The responses are then “codified so
that all values fall between 0 (weakest adherence to the rule of law) and
1 (strongest adherence to the rule of law), and aggregated at the country
level using the simple (or unweighted) average of all respondents.”14
The World Justice Project developed its index based on four universal
principles: accountability, just law, open government, and accessible
and impartial dispute resolution.15 These four principles are measured by
reference to eight factors: constraints on government powers, absence
of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and security,
regulatory enforcement, civil justice, and criminal justice.16 These eight
factors are broken down into 44 sub-factors.17 For example, factor 1,
Constraints on Government Powers, has six sub-factors: government
powers are effectively limited by the legislature, government powers are
effectively limited by the judiciary, government powers are effectively
limited by independent auditing and review, government officials are
sanctioned for misconduct, government powers are subject to nongovernmental checks, and transition of power is subject to the law.18
This article focuses on factor 4, fundamental rights. The Index
includes fundamental rights because it recognizes “that the rule of law
must be more than merely a system of rules – that indeed, a system of
positive law that fails to respect core human rights established under
international law is at best ‘rule by law’, and does not deserve to be
called a rule of law system.”19 After much debate about the scope of the
rights to be included in the index, the World Justice Project decided to
“focus on a relatively modest menu of rights that are firmly established
under international law and are most closely related to rule of law
concerns.”20 Factor 4, Fundamental Rights, has eight sub-factors: equal
treatment & absence of discrimination, the right to life & security of
the person, due process of law and rights of the accused, freedom of
opinion and expression, freedom of belief & religion, freedom from
arbitrary interference with privacy, freedom of assembly & association,
Ibid.
Ibid.
15
Ibid., p. 9.
16
Ibid., p.10.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
19
Mark David Agrast, Juan Carlos Botero, Joel Martinez, Alejandro Ponce & Christine S. Pratt, see note 5, p. 14.
20
Ibid.
13
14
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and fundamental labor rights.21
A. COMPARISONS OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
The average score for protection of fundamental rights in East Asia
and the Pacific22 for 2019 was 0.56.23 However, this figure includes
both Australia (0.79) and New Zealand (0.80), which are culturally
closer to the United Kingdom and Europe than to Asia. When those
two countries are excluded, the average for East Asia and the Pacific
drops to 0.52.24 By comparison, the average score for Europe, the
European Union Free Trade Association and North America (hereinafter
shortened to “Europe-North America”)25 for 2019 was 0.77,26 which
was 0.21 higher than East Asia and the Pacific. This is not surprising,
as the Europe-North America region has a strong cultural commitment
to both fundamental rights and rule of law. All of the top ten countries
in the world for fundamental rights are in the Europe-North American
region,27 as are nine out of the top ten countries for rule of law overall
World Justice Project, see note 8, p. 10.
East Asia and the Pacific is the regional designation used by the Index that includes
Hong Kong, Indonesia and China. The list of countries included is: Australia, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New
Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam. Ibid., p. 18.
23
This average was calculated from the 2019 fundamental rights scores for the
countries included in the East Asia and Pacific region. Ibid., p. 25. The average was
0.558667, but was rounded up to 0.56.
24
This average used the same 2019 data as was used in note 23, except that Australia
and New Zealand were omitted. The calculation came to 0.522308, but was rounded
down to 0.52.
25
The European Union, European Free Trade Association, and North America is
a regional designation used by the Index that includes Western Europe, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. The list of countries included in this regional designation is as follows: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and
United States. Ibid., p. 19.
26
This average was calculated from the 2019 fundamental rights scores for the countries included in the European Union, the European Free Trade Association, and North
America region. Ibid., p. 25. The average was 0.774167, but was rounded down to
0.77. If Australia and New Zealand were included with the other countries in this
region, which would be more culturally appropriate then including them in East Asia
and the Pacific, the average score would rise to 0.775385, which, with rounding,
would be 0.78.
27
Ibid., p. 25. The top ten, in order, for Fundamental Rights were: Finland (0.92),
21
22

141

Jeffrey E. Thomas

(with the one exception being New Zealand, which is culturally close to
Europe-North America).28
The graphics below show the two regions’ average scores for all
eight factors based on data collected for the 2017 index:
Figure 1. East Asia & the Pacific Region Compared to Europe-North America29

These graphics show that Europe-North America has significantly
higher average scores than East Asia and the Pacific on all eight rule of
law factors, and that the largest difference is on factor 4, fundamental
rights.
Another way to see the differences between the Europe-North
Denmark (0.92), Norway (0.90), Sweden (0.86), Austria (0.85), Germany (0.85), Belgium (0.84), Netherlands (0.84), Canada (0.83), Estonia (0.83) and United Kingdom
(0.82). The United States ranked 27th on this factor. The highest ranked country in the
East Asia and Pacific region was New Zealand (0.80), ranked 12th, and the highest
ranked culturally Asian country was Japan (0.78), ranked 17th.
28
Ibid., p. 16. The top ten ranked countries, in order, were: Denmark (0.90), Norway
(0.89), Finland (0.87), Sweden (0.85), Netherlands (0.84), Germany (0.84), Austria
(0.82), New Zealand (0.82), Canada (0.81), and Estonia (0.81). The highest ranked
culturally Asian country was Singapore (0.80).
29
World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2017-2018, available at: https://
worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/research-and-data/wjp-rule-law-index2017%E2%80%932018, accessed on 12 April 2019, p. 18-19. These graphics were
not generated for the 2019 Index.
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America countries and East Asia and the Pacific is to look at individual
countries’ scores and rankings on fundamental rights. The table below
shows countries in the two regions side-by-side by fundamental rights
score and rank from the 2019 Index:
Table 1. Fundamental Rights Scores and Rankings Compared: Europe-North America to East Asia
and the Pacific30

Country
Finland
Denmark
Norway
Sweden
Austria
Germany
Belgium
Netherlands
Canada
Estonia
United Kingdom
Portugal
Czech Republic
Spain
France
Slovenia
Italy
United States
Romania
Bulgaria

Score
0.92
0.9
0.92
0.86
0.84
0.85
0.84
0.84
0.83
0.83
0.82
0.79
0.78
0.78
0.74
0.73
0.73
0.72
0.7
0.6

Global
Factor
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
14
15
16
20
23
25
27
29
51

Country

Score

Hungary
Greece
Poland
Croatia
New Zealand
Australia
Japan
South Korea
Singapore
Hong Kong
Mongolia
Indonesia
Malaysia
Thailand
Vietnam
Philippines
Cambodia
China
Myanmar

0.58
0.66
0.66
0.65
0.8
0.79
0.78
0.74
0.69
0.66
0.58
0.52
0.48
0.48
0.46
0.42
0.35
0.32
0.31

Global
Factor
Rank
56
36
38
39
12
13
17
22
30
33
57
82
90
89
97
105
117
121
123

This table shows that the Europe-North American region has much
stronger scores on protection of fundamental rights. The lowest country
in that region is Hungary (a former member of the Soviet bloc), with a
score of 0.58 and a rank of 56th. Nine out of the fifteen countries in the
East Asia and the Pacific region scored below Hungary on protection
of fundamental rights, and three out of the fifteen (Cambodia, China,
30

World Justice Project, see note 8, at p. 25.
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and Myanmar) score in the bottom 10% on protection of fundamental
rights for the 126 countries included in the index. Japan, which is the
highest scoring country on the factor with Asian culture, scored at about
the mid-point of the Europe-North America region, tied with the Czech
Republic and Spain.

B. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
A country’s score for fundamental rights is an average of its scores
for the eight sub-factors. The two sub-factors most relevant to the
analysis of this article are sub-factors 4.4, freedom of opinion and
expression (hereafter shortened to “freedom of expression”), and 4.7
freedom of assembly and association (hereafter shortened to “freedom
of association”).31 These two factors were directly involved in the
Occupy Central as the protestors were exercising both freedom of
expression and freedom of association. The chart below provides the
country scores and global ranking for these two sub-factors for all of
the countries in the East Asia and the Pacific region, except Australia
and New Zealand, which were excluded as being significantly different
in their culture.

Ibid., p. 12. The other six factors not included in this analysis are equal treatment
& absence of discrimination, the right to life & security of the person, due process of
law and rights of the accused, freedom of belief & religion, freedom from arbitrary
interference with privacy, and fundamental labor rights.
31
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Table 2. Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Association Scores for East Asia and the Pacific
(excepting Australia and New Zealand)32

Country
Japan
South Korea
Singapore
Hong Kong
Mongolia
Indonesia
Malaysia
Thailand
Vietnam
Philippines
Cambodia
China
Myanmar
Average

Fundamental
Rights
0.78
0.74
0.69
0.66
0.58
0.52
0.48
0.48
0.46
0.42
0.35
0.32
0.31
0.52

Global
Freedom
Rights
of ExpresRank
sion
17
0.72
22
0.65
30
0.50
33
0.57
57
0.63
82
0.67
90
0.46
89
0.52
97
0.40
105
0.56
117
0.31
121
0.12
123
0.40
0.50

Expression
Rank
23
40
85
70
47
37
93
82
105
73
116
125
107

Freedom
of Association
0.73
0.69
0.49
0.62
0.68
0.66
0.44
0.46
0.37
0.57
0.41
0.17
0.35
0.51

Association
Rank
35
45
98
69
47
54
104
103
114
84
108
125
115

This table shows that, in general, the sub-factor scores for freedom
of expression and freedom of association are lower than the scores for
the fundamental rights factor. The average fundamental rights score for
this group was 0.52 compared to an average score of 0.50 for freedom
of expression and 0.51 for freedom of association. Japan, which has the
highest score and ranking in this group for fundamental rights (0.78,
global rank 17), has a lower scores for freedom of expression (0.72,
global rank 23) and freedom of association (0.73, global rank 35).
This table was generated from data included in the Rule of Law Index 2019. The
author obtained the data in a spreadsheet from the World Justice Project website. See
World Justice Project, “Current and Historical Data”, available at: https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/research-and-data/wjp-rule-law-index-2019/current-historical-data, accessed on 12 March 2019. The reader can verify scores for individual
countries by going to the country reports in the Index. See, for example, “Japan Country Report”, World Justice Project Rule, see note 8, p. 91. The Index did not include
global rankings on sub-factors. Those were calculated by putting sub-factor scores
in rank-order. As has been the custom with the Index, the scores and averages were
rounded to two decimal places.
32
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Singapore is perhaps the most dramatically different country, with a
freedom of expression score of 0.50, which is a global rank of 85. This
is much lower than its overall fundamental rights score of 0.69, and
its rank of 30th. Singapore’s score for freedom of association is 0.49,
which is 0.01 lower than its expression score, leading to a global rank
of 98.
Myanmar, Mongolia, Indonesia, and the Philippines are interesting
exceptions where their scores and rankings for freedom of expression
and freedom of association are significantly higher than their overall
scores for fundamental rights. Myanmar’s score for fundamental
rights was 0.31 (global rank 123, last), while its score for freedom of
expression was 0.40 (global rank 107), and its score for freedom of
association was 0.35 (global rank 115). Mongolia’s fundamental rights
score was 0.58, (global rank 57), but its freedom of expression score
was 0.63 (global rank 47) and its freedom of association score was 0.68
(global rank 47). Indonesia’s score for freedom of expression was 0.67
(global rank of 37) and for freedom of association was 0.66 (global rank
54) compared to its overall fundamental rights score of 0.52 (global
rank 82). The Philippines had a score of 0.42 (global rank 105) for
fundamental rights, but improved to 0.56 (global rank 73) for freedom
of expression and to 0.57 (global rank 84).
Notwithstanding these exceptions, the scores for the freedom of
expression and freedom of association sub-factors are significantly
lower in East Asia and the Pacific compared to Europe-North America.
The average of the scores for freedom of expression in Europe-North
America is 0.76, and the average for freedom of association is 0.80,
compared to averages of 0.50 and 0.51 for East Asia and the Pacific.33
Mongolia (0.63/0.68), Indonesia (0.67/0.66), and the Philippines
(0.56/0.57), the three countries that scored higher on the sub-factors
than on the general fundamental rights factor, were all still lower than
the averages of 0.76 and 0.80 in Europe-North America. The lowest
scores for these two sub-factors in the Europe-North America group
was for Hungary, 0.48 on both sub-factors.34 Although this is below
the average for East Asia and the Pacific, it is higher than five out of
The average scores for Europe-North America were calculated by the author based
on the scores reported in the 2019 Index. The scores for East Asia and the Pacific
were calculated for table 2 using the same data, but scores from Australia and New
Zealand were excluded from the calculations because they are not culturally Asian.
See note 33.
34
World Justice Project, see note 8, p. 85 (Hungary’s country report).
33
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the thirteen countries in East-Asian and the Pacific for freedom of
expression, and is higher than six countries in that region for freedom
of association.35 We now turn to turn to a possible cultural explanation
for these differences.
III. ASIAN CULTURE REGARDING THE INDIVIDUAL
Although there are many ways one might try to measure culture, for
the purposes of this article, we turn to the work of Geert Hofstede, a social
psychologist who identifed several dimentions of national culture while
working on transnational management issues with IBM.36 Based on data
collected from more than 116,000 questionnaires from IBM employees
and business school students from 72 countries,37 Hofstede identified
four dimensions of national cultures: power distance, uncertainty
avoidance, individualism, and masculinity.38 Subsequent work done in
collaboration with Michael Harris Bond in exploring Asian cultures and
seeking to avoid Western bias resulted in the development of a fifth
dimesion, originally labeled long-term orientation39 which is now called
pragmatism.40 These dimensions of culture have been validated, and the
measures and outcomes have been replicated.41
This article focuses on the factor known as individualism because it
may have some explanatory power for the tendency for Asian countries
to have lower scores on fundamental rights.42 A national culture’s
For freedom of expression, Hungary scored 0.48, which was higher than Malaysia (0.46), Myanmar (0.40), Vietnam (0.40), Cambodia (0.31), and China (0.12). For
freedom of association, Hungary also scored 0.48, which was higher than Thailand
(0.46), Malaysia (0.44), Cambodia (0.41), Vietnam (0.37), Myanmar (0.35), and China (0.17). See Table 2.
35

36

See generally Geert Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in WorkRelated Values, Sage, 1980. After more than two decades of subsequent work and validation,
the second edition was published in 2001. See Geert Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions and Organizations Across Nations, second edition, Sage,
2001. All subsequent citations will be to the second edition.
37
Geert Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, see note 33, p. 41.
38
Ibid. p. 58.
39
Ibid. p. 69–71.
40
See Geert Hofstede, “The 6-D model of national culture”, available at: https://geerthofstede.
com/culture-geert-hofstede-gert-jan-hofstede/6d-model-of-national-culture/, accessed on 23
March 2019.
41
Geert Hofstede, see note 37, pp. 65–68.

The other dimensions of national culture are Power Distance Index, Masculinity,
Uncertainty Avoidance, and Pragmatism. Power Distance Index is a measure of at42
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preference for individualism is evaluated in compairson to that country’s
preference towards collectivity. The individualism dimension “describes
the relationship between the individual and the collectivity that prevails
in a given society.”43 A high score on this dimesion suggests a greater
feeling of individual independence. “It meas that invidivual choices and
decisions are expected.” 44 On the other hand, a low score “means that
one ‘know one’s place’ in life, which is determined socially. With a
metaphor from physics, people in an individualist society are more like
atoms flying around in a gas while those in collectivist societies are more
like atoms fixed in a crystal.”45 Countries with a higher invidualism
score, who therefore place a higher value on the invidual compared to
groups, seem more likely to have greater protection for fundamental
rights of individuals.
As might be expected, Asian countries tend to have a lower score on
the individuality dimension than countries in Europe and North America.
Table 3, below, provides the individualism scores for countries in the
Europe-North America and East Asia and the Pacific groups.46 Because
Australia and New Zealand are reported separately, under the heading
of Oceania, they are shown as a separate geographic grouping in this
table. The high scores in Australia and New Zealnad for individualism
show their cultural similarity to Europe and North American rather than
the other countries in East Asia and the Pacific.
titudes towards inequality. Geert Hofstede, see note 37, p. 79. Masculity is a measure
of preferences for male-oriented ego goals such as careers and money. Ibid. p. at 279.
Uncertainty Avoidance is a measure of society’s preference to deal with uncertainty
“through the domains of technology, law, and religion.” Ibid. p. 145. Pragmatism is
the measure of characteristics associated with Chinese culture, such as persistence,
ordering relationships by status and observing that order, thrift, and a sense of shame
on the long-term side, and, on the short-term side, values of personal steadiness and
stability, protecting one’s ‘face,’ respect for tradition, and reciprocation of greetings,
gifts and favors. Ibid. pp. 352-353. These dimensions may well be correlated with
certain tendencies for Asian countries regarding rule of law, but because this article
is focused on the Occupy Central movement, it has focused on the individualism
dimension in that the movement exercised freedom of expression and freedom of association.
43
44
45

Ibid. p. 209.
Geert Hofstede, see note 41.
Ibid.

These scores were obtained from geerthofstede.com and are the data used in the
2015 version of his books. “Dimension data matrix”, available at: https://geerthofstede.com/research-and-vsm/dimension-data-matrix/, accessed on 23 March 2019.
Scores were not available for Cambodia, Mongolia, or Myanmar.
46
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Table 3. Individualism Scores for countries in the Europe-North America and East Asia and the
Pacific Groups

Europe-North Am.
Country
IDV
US
91

Oceania
Country
Australia

UK
Netherlands
Canada
Hungary
Italy
Belgium
Denmark
Swedan
France
Norway
Germany
Finland
Estonia
Poland
Czech Repub.
Austria
Spain
Greece
Croatia
Romania
Bulgaria
Portugal
Slovenia

New Zealand

89
80
80
80
76
75
74
71
71
69
67
63
60
60
58
55
51
35
33
30
30
27
27

IDV
90
79

E. Asia & Pacific
Country
Japan
Philippines
Malaysia
Hong Kong
Singapore
Thailand
China
South Korea
Indonesia
Cambodia
Mongolia
Myanmar

IDV
46
32
26
25
20
20
20
18
14
NA
NA
NA

Although a few countries at the bottom of the Europe-North America
group have scores comparable to the East Asia and the Pacific countries,
the great majority of Europe-North America countries have much higher
individualism scores. The average score for Europe-North America is
60.5, compared to an average of 24.56 for East Asia and the Pacific.
The highest score for an East Asia country is 46 for Japan, which is well
149
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below the average for Europe-North America.
As can be seen in Figure 2, below, and Appendix 1, the individualism
scores are strongly correlated to fundamental rights and the subfactors of freedom of expression and freedom of association. When the
data are compared for the full set of countries in the two groups, the
correlation between individualism and fundamental rights is 0.6134.47
The correlation is slightly stronger for the two subfactors: 0.6399
for freedom of expression and 0.6408 for freedom of association.48
These correlations are statistically signifiant to a 99% level.49 These
correlations support the theory that the cultural value for individualism
is part of the explanation for higher scores in protection of fundamental
rights, freedom of expression, and freedom of association in the
combined groups.
Figure 2. Individualism Correlated with Fundamental Rights, Freedom of Expression, and
Freedom of Association

While difference in the cultural value of individualism helps to explain
the scores in the group as a whole, the correlations are much weaker
when the groups are separated. The correlations within the EuropeNorth American group are only 0.3772 for fundamental rights, 0.4534
47
48
49

See Appendix 1.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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for freedom of expression, and 0.3929 for freedom of Assocation.50
These correlations are significant to a 90% level for fundameant
rights and freedom of association, and to a 95% level for freedom of
expression.51 For the East Asia and the Pacific, the correlations are even
weaker (though because of the small number of countries for which
we have data, the correlations for East Asia and the Pacific are not
statistically significant). For fundamental rights, the correlation with
individualism is 0.3017. For freedom of expressioin the correlation is
0.2973, and for freedom of association it is 0.3203.52 This suggests that
while Asian cultural values may explain some of the difference between
the groups, it explains much less of the difference within the groups.
In other words, within the groups something other than the cultural
commitment to individualism accounts for differences in the scores for
fundamental rights, freedom of expression, and freedom of association.
Specific examples within the groups show that some counties with
low individualism scores may nevertheless have relatively high scores
for fundamental rights and the related sub-factors. The most dramatic
example of this is Indonesia, which has an individualism score of 14,
the lowest score of all the countries compared. Notwithstanding this
very weak cultural commitment to individuals, Indonesia’s score for
fundamental rights of 0.52 was about at the average for East Asia and
the Pacific group, but, remarkably, Indonesia’s scores for freedom
of expression and freedom of association were 0.67, and 0.66, fairly
close to the scores of Japan (0.72 and 0.73), which were the highest
in the group.53 In the Europe-North America group, Portugal has an
individualism score of 27, which is close to the average of the East Asia
and the Pacific group, yet it scored 0.79 in fundamental rights, 0.81 in
freedom of expression, and 0.86 in freedom of association.54
Even though some countries are exceptional because,
nothwithstanding lower individualism scores, they have higher than
expected scores on fundamental rights, freedom of expression, and
freedom of association, these data suggest that there may be an upper
bound for protection of those rights for Asian countries. Japan has
the highest score for individualsm of countries in the East Asia and
the Pacific group (excepting Australia and New Zealand on cultural
50
51
52
53
54
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grounds), a 46, but its scores for fundamental rights (0.78), freedom of
expression (0.72) and freedom of association (0.73)55 are still below the
averages for Europe-North America(0.80/0.78/0.80).56 Portugal is the
country from the Europe-North America group that has one of the lowest
individualism scores, a 27, yet still has robust protection for fundamental
rights (0.79), freedom of expression (0.81), and freedom of association
(0.86).57 However, while a 27 for individualism is exceptionally low for
Europe-North America, it is still above average for East Asia and the
Pacific. The examples of Japan and Portugal suggest that as countries
in East Asia and the Pacific progress in rule of law, they can improve
in the protection of fundamental rights, but it seems unlikely that they
will surpass the protections provided by Japan, which is below the
average of countries in Europe-North America. In other words, because
of the weak cultural commitment to individualism, it seems unlikely the
countries in East Asia and the Pacific will reach the level of protection
of fundamental rights seen in Europe and North America. Japan’s score
for fundamental rights, a respectable 0.78, seems likely to be about as
high as a country will achieve in the East Asia and the Pacific group.
IV. OCCUPY CENTRAL AS A REFLECTION OF CULTURAL
COMMITMENT TO THE COMMUNITY
The Occupy Central movement provides an historic narrative that
provides another way to evaluate this theoru regarding the interaction
of law and culture. The protesters exercised their fundamental rights
of expression and association, which is what one would expect in a
jurisdiction protecting the rule of law (as defined by the World Justice
Project). But was there also evidence of the suggested limitation on
protection of fundamental rights because of Asian culture’s weaker
commitment to individualism? Does the historical narrative of Occupy
Central support the theory that Asian culture bounds the protection of
individual rights to some point below the level of protection afforded
in Europe and North America? This section of the article answers those
questions.

55
56
57

Ibid.
See Table 1.
See Appendix 1.
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A. THE OCCUPY CENTRAL STORY
Although the formal protests of the Occupy Central movement
began in September of 2014,58 the work of the movement began more
than a year before. Occupy Central with Love and Peace was started in
an effort to mend a schism that developed within the pro-democracy
supporters in 2012. The Democratic Party in 2012 participated in secret
negotiations with Chinese officials about the reform of Hong Kong’s
Legislative Council. Some pro-democracy groups wanted to eliminate
the “functional seats” of the council that were not elected, but were
appointed to represent various constituencies. In the secret negotiations,
the Democratic Party conceded an ongoing role for the functional seats
in the council. This upset others seeking to promote democracy.59 To
mend the schism, OCLP proposed to organize broad-based, civilsociety discussions about reforms followed by a non-governmental
referendum.60
Occupy Central with Love and Peace organized three waives of
discussion days in 2013 and 2014. The first discussion took place at
University of Hong Kong and was attended by approximately 700
people from both moderate and more radical pro-democracy groups.
The participants engaged in a rational discussion of concerns about
proposed nominating committee to be used to select candidates for
Chief Executive of Hong Kong.61 This initial discussion was followed
by additional discussions with different community groups (e.g.
university students, social workers, laborers, women, church groups,
and the chronically ill) between October 2013, and January 2014. These
Kin-man Chan, see note 2. Additional sources include: “Occupy Central is on:
Benny Tai rides wave of student protest to launch movement”, South China Morning
Post, 27 September 2014, available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1601625/hong-kong-students-beat-us-it-benny-tai-declares-start-occupy-central,
accessed on 12 April 2019; “Thousands of Protestors Take to Streets for Second Night
of Pro-Democracy Demonstrations”, South China Morning Post, 29 September 2014,
available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1603817/riot-policewithdrawn-defiant-protesters-dig-second-day-occupy, accessed on 12 April 2019;
Chris Buckley and Alan Wong, “Crackdown on Protests by Hong Kong Police Draws
More to the Streets”, New York Times, 29 September 2014, available at: https://www.
nytimes.com/2014/09/29/world/asia/clashes-in-hong-kong.html, accessed on 12
April 2019.
59
Kin-man Chan, see note 2, pp. 1-2.
60
Ibid., p. 2.
61
Ibid., p. 2.
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discussions involved about 3000 participants.62 The third discussion
day was held at five different locations simultaneously on May 4,
2014, in which some 2500 citizens deliberated on 15 proposed reform
proposals.63 At the end of the day, participants selected three proposals
to be included in the referendum.64
Even though the electronic voting system used for the referendum was
subject to unprecedented attacks by hackers, ultimately, approximately
800,000 Hong Kong residents voted in the non-governmental
referendum. The proposal for the three-track system (civil, political
party, or legislative council nomination) advanced by Alliance for True
Democracy received the most votes.65 In addition, 88% of votes agreed
that the Legislative Council “should veto any government proposal that
did not meet international standards of universal suffrage.”66
The referendum did not influence the Chinese government. A decision
from the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on
August 31, 2014, adopted a nominating process consistent with current
practice. Candidates for the Chief Executive of Hong Kong would be
required to receive support from 50% of the nominating committee
made up of 1,200 representatives from four sectors of society, and
the number of candidates was to be restricted to no more than two or
three.67 In response to this decision, Occupy Central with Love and
Peace intended to launch protests on October 1, China’s National Day.68
However, students were impatient so started an occupation of Civic
Square on September 26.69 Shortly thereafter, some 50,000 people
gathered outside the square in support of the students.70 In the early
morning hours of September 28, Occupy Central with Love and Peace
announced that the planned protests would begin immediately.71
Ibid., p. 2.
Ibid., p. 3.
64
Ibid., p. 3.
65
Ibid., pp. 3-4.
66
Ibid.
67
Ibid., p. 4.
68
Ibid.
69
“Occupy Central won’t start early, says Benny Tai, after student clashes with police leave dozens injured”, South China Morning Post, 26 September 2014, available
at: https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1601262/chaotic-scenes-studentsbreak-civic-square-class-boycott-ends, accessed on 12 April 2019.
70
Kin-man Chan, see note 2, p. 5.
71
Ibid.
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Police reacted to the protests with tear gas on Sunday, September
28.72 Those who were occupying the area used umbrellas to protect
themselves, resulting in the umbrella becoming a symbol of the
movement.73 Images and reports of the police attacks against the
protestors were shared on social media, television, and in the press,
resulting in many people in Hong Kong rallying to the cause.74
Over the next two and one half months, the occupation of three areas
in Hong Kong continued. During this time, protestors tried to open
negotiations with government officials. Shortly after the protests began,
a deputy to the Hong Kong Chief Executive met with students.75 Further
meetings with the government, however, were called off by the students
after clashes between students and pro-government supporters.76 About
two weeks later student leaders and government officials debated on
live television.77 In November, student leaders tried to travel to Beijing
to confront Chinese leaders, but they were prevented from boarding the
flight.78
The beginning of the end of the occupation was triggered by a court
order in mid-November refusing to hear the protesters’ appeal and
refusing to stay the injunction against the occupation. With the appellate
relief denied, the police were authorized to enforce the injunction and to
begin clearing the occupation.79 The police cleared some of the site, but
Chris Buckley and Alan Wong, see note 59.
Kin-man Chan, see note 2, p. 5.
74
Chris Buckley and Alan Wong, see note 59.
75
Austin Ramzy and Keith Bradsher, “Hong Kong Leader Refuses to Resign, but
Deputy to Meet with Protesters”, New York Times, 2 October 2014, available at:
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/03/world/asia/hong-kong-protests.html, accessed
on 12 April 2019.
76
“After angry mods turn on protesters, students call off talks”, South China Morning Post, 4 October 2014, available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1609166/after-angry-mobs-turn-protesters-students-call-talks, accessed on 12
April 2019.
77
“Who’s who at Hong Kong’s students vs government debate”, South China Morning Post, 21 October 2014, available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/
article/1621237/who-who-tuesdays-dialogue-between-hong-kong-government-andstudents, accessed on 12 April 2019.
78
Joyce Ng, Amy Nip, & Stuart Lau, “Beijing bans student leaders from taking trip
to mainland to press for democracy”, South China Morning Post, 15 November 2014.
79
Julie Chu and Bryan Harris, “Appeal court clear way for bailiffs to end Occupy
protest in Mong Kok”, South China Morning Post, 16 November 2014, available at:
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1640976/appeal-court-denies-hear72
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protestors tried to reclaim the site. A second order a few days later was
also enforced.80 On December 3, 2014, the leaders of Occupy Central
with Peace and Love call on the students to retreat from the protest
sites, and, along with 60 protestors, the leaders turn themselves in to the
Hong Kong Police. By December 15, 2014, the last of the protest sites
was cleared.81
B. ASIAN VALUES IN THE OCCUPY CENTRAL STORY
A closer look at the historical narrative of Occupy Central will
show the Asian values of the activists in Hong Kong. The “universal
suffrage” that was sought was more about the community’s right to
elect people to represent it than about the individual’s right to vote.
When protestors undertook the occupation of public spaces, they did
so in a way that sought to reduce the impact on the community. When
the occupation ended, it did so in large part out of concern for the
community, reflecting a concern about the consequences of exercising
the freedoms of expression and association.
1. Occupy Central’s Objective was to Promote Community Interests
The Occupy Central protestors were exercising their rights of
expression and association to advance the interests of the community
as a whole. The movement was a response to the Chinese government’s
interpretation of the requirements of the hand-over agreement that
Hong Kong move towards universal suffrage in the selection of the
Chief Executive of Hong Kong.82 The Basic Law of Hong Kong
provides in Article 45: “The ultimate aim [of the method for selection]
ing-clearing-way-end-occupy-central-protests, accessed on 12 April 2019.
80
Julie Chu, “High Court judge’s refusal to stall injunction gives green light for
Admiralty clearance”, South China Morning Post, 5 December 2014, available at:
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1656244/high-court-set-rule-occupy-protesters-bid-stall-admiralty-clearance, accessed on 12 April 2019.
81
Kin-man Chan, see note 2, p. 6.
82
The idea for the Occupy Central movement can be traced to a column by Benny Tai Yiu-ting in the Hong Kong Economic Journal suggesting “10,000 people to
block road in the financial heart of the city should the central and local governments
create a system for the 2017 chief executive election that did not allow a ‘genuine’
choice of candidates.” Cary Cheung & Jeffie Lam, “Original Hong Kong Occupy Plan
veered off script”, South China Morning Post, 3 December 2014, available at: https://
www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1654286/original-hong-kong-occupy-planveered-script, accessed 29 March 2019.
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is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon
nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in
accordance with democratic procedures.”83 Although the press framed
the Occupy Central movement about the right of universal suffrage,
in fact the dispute was about the nomination procedures. The Chinese
Government, in Standing Committee’s August 31 decision, outlined a
nomination procedure that was consistent with current practice in Hong
Kong. A candidate for Chief Executive would be nominated if he or
she were to receive at least 50% endorsement from a 1200 member
nominating committee representing four sectors of society.84 The prodemocracy advocates were concerned that this method gave the Chinese
government too much influence over the nomination process. Many of
the nominating committee would be appointed by the government, and
those members would work to prevent the nomination of any candidate
disfavored by the Chinese government.85
The discussion process organized by Occupy Central with Love and
Peace generated proposals that would open the nomination process to a
broader array of candidates. The three proposals voted on by the civic
referendum were:
1) Proposal of the Alliance for True Democracy: Nomination of
candidates for Chief Executive through one of three possible
channels: a. civil nomination (endorsement by 1% of registered
votes), b. political party nomination (the political party must have
received at least 5% of the valid votes in the prior Legislative Council
elections), or c. nomination by the Legislative Council nominating
committee.86
2) People Power proposal: nomination by a nominating committee
composed of all popularly elected district councilors and legislative
councilors who would nominate candidates who had the endorsement
of 1% of registered votes in a geographical constituency, the
endorsement of 5% of legislative councilors, or the endorsement of
Hong Kong Basic Law Art. 45.
See note 68.
85
“Hong Kong: Occupy Central anger over Beijing ruling”, BBC News, 31 August
2014, available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-29004025, accessed
on 12 April 2019.
86
Proposals, PopVote, 6.20-29 Civil Referendum Proposals, available at: https://
popvote.hk/english/project/vote_622/proposal/, accessed in 12 April 2019/
83
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5% of district councilors.87
3) Students’ Proposal (from Hong Kong Federation of Students and
Scholarism): nomination by a nominating committee comprised of
all popularly elected legislative councilors who would nominate
candidates who received endorsement from 1% of voters or
endorsement or 8% of the nominating committee.88
Because of disputes about the inclusion of public nomination
in all three proposals, Occupy Central with Love and Peace “added
an additional motion to the referendum to encourage those who did
not support public nomination to take part [in the referendum]: ‘The
Legislative Council should veto any proposed election method violating
international standards of universal suffrage that fails to provide voters
genuine choice.”89
The first proposal, by the Alliance for True Democracy, received
the largest number of votes, showing that what most people wanted
was a nominating system that would provide more open pathways to
nomination for the office of Chief Executive. While one could perhaps
construe this expression of public opinion as an endorsement of an
individual’s right to run for Chief Executive, the historical narrative
shows that the concern was about community choice, and about
reducing interference and manipulation by the Chinese government. The
additional motion added to the referendum also reflects a community
orientation. While the motion references the “international standards of
universal suffrage,” the point of the motion is to allow voters “genuine
choice” between candidates. This motion received a favorable vote
from 88% of those who participated in the referendum,90 showing a
strong community endorsement of the universal suffrage to give the
community a choice in the selection of the Chief Executive.
b. Occupy Central Protesters Sought to Reduce Impact to the Community
While the protesters were exercising their rights to free expression
and association, an Asian orientation was reflected by steps protestors
87
88
89
90

Ibid.
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Kin-man Chan, see note 2, p. 3.
Ibid., p. 4.
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took to reduce the impact on the community. Admittedly, the occupation
caused traffic problems. The authorities, sharing the same sense of
community as the protestors, hoped that these traffic problems would
cause the protestors to withdraw from their protests.91 Although the
protestors did not withdraw to solve the traffic problems, they took
steps to reduce the harmful consequences of the occupation. For
example, a few days into the occupation, the protestors made way
for civil service workers to return to their offices.92 Similarly, some
protesters volunteered to direct pedestrian traffic to make movement
in the occupied areas more efficient.93 The protestors also organized a
system to recycling and trash collection system to minimize the impact
of protestor waste.94
While these efforts also improved the occupation experience for
protestors, they show that the protesters were concerned about the
comfort of others. In addition, the protesters’ efforts went beyond what
was necessary for their own interests. Jason Ng, a lawyer, eyewitness,
and participant in the occupation, provides an illustration that makes
the community orientation clear:
If [a protester] saw so much as a chewing gum splotch on the sidewalk,
he would quietly pick up a putty knife and start scraping. Soon, two others
like him would join in and a fledgling gum removal team would spring to
life.95

The movement also tried to minimize the economic impact of
the occupation. Originally, the occupation was scheduled to begin on
October 1, a national holiday, to minimize economic impact.96 However,
Ibid., p. 5.
Michael Forsythe & Alan Wong, “Protest Organizers Claim Progress for Hong
Kong”, New York Times, 6 October 2014, available at: https://www.nytimes.
com/2014/10/07/world/asia/hong-kong-protests.html, accessed on 12 April 2019.
93
Jason Y. Ng, Umbrellas in Bloom: Hong Kong’s occupy movement uncovered,
Blacksmith Books, 2016, p. 167.
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Ibid., p. 223 (waste management was a high priority). Jason Ng gives first-hand
account of clean-up efforts: “Several times a day cleaning crews from the supply units
fanned out across the village with rags, brushes and buckets. They scrubbed toilets,
wiped counters, and replenished toilet paper.” Ibid. p. 234.
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the government’s response to student protests created a unique moment
that resulted in the occupation starting a few days earlier. In addition,
the occupation lasted some 79 days, much longer than the three days
originally planned.97 Consequently, the occupation had a negative impact
on the local economy.98 Ultimately, these economic consequences were
part of the reason for ending the occupation.99
The movement stressed that protesters “must not engage in
physical or verbal conflicts with law enforcers, nor damage any
public properties.”100 To prevent violence, the movement provided
non-violence workshops and deployed hundreds of stewards.101 For
example, at the occupation site in Admiralty, 200 stewards were on duty
Ibid.
For example, sales were down by 46% at the Pacific Place mall next to the occupy
site in Admiralty. See Tiffany Ap & Phila Siu, “46pc sale slump at Pacific Place, says
tenant of upmarket mall”, South China Morning Post 1 December 2014, available at:
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1653234/46pc-sales-slump-pacificplace-says-tenant-upmarket-mall, accessed 2 April 2019. However, an analysis done
by the World Bank found that the Occupy Central movement did not negatively affect
the positive business environment in Hong Kong. See Sijia Jiang, “World Bank says
Occupy protests fail to impact Hong Kong’s business climate”, South China Morning Post, 29 October 2014, available at: https://www.scmp.com/business/economy/
article/1627626/world-bank-says-occupy-protests-fail-impact-hks-business-climate,
accessed 2 April 2019.
99
“Occupy violence at Legco complex a step too far”, South China Morning Post,
20 November 2014, available at: https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/
article/1644066/occupy-violence-legco-complex-step-too-far, accessed 2 April 2019
(“As acknowledged by one of the three core leaders [of Occupy Central], the disruptions and grievances caused by the Occupy movement have exceeded acceptable
levels.”); Felix Chung, “End Occupy protests to give small businesses a chance to recover, before it’s too late,” South China Morning Post, November 11, 2014, available
at:
https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1637478/end-occupyprotests-give-small-businesses-chance-recover-its?page=all, accessed 2 April 2019.
100
Occupy Central with Love and Peace, “Manual of Disobedience”, 24 September
2014, available at: https://oclphkenglish.wordpress.com/2014/09/24/manual-of-disobedience/, accessed 2 April 2019.
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See Occupy Central with Love and Peace, “Basic Tenets”, available at https://
oclphkenglish.wordpress.com/about-2/tenets/, accessed 2 April 2019 (“Mandatory
workshops on the art and skill of non-violence will be provided” . . . and “Hundreds
of stewards will be deployed during Occupy Central to prevent rowdy behavior by or
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to keep the peace.102 Remarkably, these efforts to protect property were
so effective that the occupation went for more than 50 days before a
single piece of glass was broken.103 This non-violence was ended when
a small group smashed two glass doors at the building that houses the
Legislative Council.104 Although a few hundred protesters were at the
scene, this was not the work of the movement, but instead an effort
by a more radical minority of the protesters to end the stalemate with
the government.105 Significantly, it was Occupy Central stewards who
reported the incident to the police.106
Another significant example of a community orientation in the
movement was the commitment of protestors to continuing their studies.
Twelve days into the occupation, volunteers built a “study corner” with
tables, chairs, and LED lamps so that students could keep up on their
school work.107 The study corner became so popular that it was expanded.
By the end of October it had tripled in size, had two full-time volunteers
to oversee it, and many volunteer tutors.108 According to Jason Ng, a
journalist and adjunct law professor, this was “one of the most talked
about features” of the movement: “protestors in full protective gear
doing homework with pencils and highlighters. The phenomenon was
bizarre, inspiring, and so very Hong Kong.”109 While on one hand the
students were protecting themselves from the consequences of missing
classes, it also shows the students’ commitment to community values of
education and not disappointing their parents and elders.
Of course, the protesters’ non-violence was a political strategy meant
to build support for the protest movement. However, this non-violence
Jason Y. Ng, see note 94, p. 232.
South China Morning Post, see note 99 (“Until yesterday, the world had been
watching in amazement that our mass street protests had continued for more than 50
days without a single piece of glass broken.”).
104
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and respect for property also reflects the Asian cultural commitment to
the interests of the community. While non-violence has been used by
other protest movements, here it seemed to be extraordinary. Jason Ng
summarized these efforts in these words:
[The protesters] braved police crackdowns for their political ideals, but
were never too busy to clean up after themselves or keep each other wellfed. The occupy movement was bloodless, but it was also spotless and
selfless. No wonder the foreign press called this “the most civilized street
protest in the world.”110

Notwithstanding being “the most civilized street protest in the
world,” the government prosecuted key leaders of the movement
on criminal charges for inciting a public nuisance. This reflects the
importance of community rights to avoid the inconvenience caused by
the occupation. The court applied a “reasonableness test” to determine
whether the protesters’ “conduct impinged unreasonably on the rights
of others.”111 Although the court asserted that it was giving “substantial
weight” to the protesters’ right to demonstrate under Hong Kong’s Basic
Law,112 it concluded that “the obstruction in the planned occupation”
impinged “unreasonably upon the rights of others” so much so “that the
significant and protected right to demonstrate should be displaced.”113
This “unreasonable” impingement was proven by evidence such as
certificates showing “the number of public bus routes that had to be
diverted or suspended” and “the number of passengers who would be
affected.”114
C. OCCUPY CENTRAL ENDED IN PART TO PROTECT
COMMUNITY INTERESTS
While it is perhaps debatable whether the inconvenience caused by
the occupation made the exercise of the protesters’ rights unreasonable,
the leaders’ concern about the inconvenience was one of the reasons
that the occupation ended. After the one episode of violence associated
with a small group of protesters, one of the three core leaders of the
Ibid. p. 151.
HKSAR v. Tai Yiu Ting, DCCC 480/2017, ¶ 68.
112
For example, see Ibid. ¶ 278.
113
Ibid. ¶¶ 363, 398 (“the obstruction that would be caused by the occupation . . .
made the obstruction an unreasonable use of the carriageway in or in the neighbourhood of Central”).
114
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movement concluded that “the disruptions and grievances caused by the
Occupy movement have exceeded acceptable levels.”115 Another of the
core leaders “resumed his teaching duties on campus” and suggested that
“the least the protesters should do is make the occupied sites smaller.”116
Benny Tai, whose essay about non-violence spurred the movement,
reported at a press conference that, for “the sake of occupier safety and
for the sake of the original intention of love and peace, as we prepare to
surrender, we three [core leaders] urge students to retreat, to put down
deep roots in the community and transform the movement to extend the
spirit of the umbrella movement.”117 This “forthright and prominent”
call gave voice to “deepening fears that the street occupations were
angering residents and risking clashes with the police.”118
Concerns of Hong Kong residents were reflected in responses to
surveys about the movement. By late November, a University of Hong
Kong survey showed “that nearly 83% of Hongkongers want[ed] the
Occupy Central protests to stop, while more than two-thirds believe[d]
the government should clear the protest sites.”119 This was a substantial
erosion in support for the movement. In late October, support for the
movement was growing.120 A series of surveys done by the Chinese
University of Hong Kong in September, October, and November 2014
South China Morning Post, see note 100.
Albert Cheng, “End occupation of Hong Kong and focus on mass electoral campaign for democracy”, South China Morning Post, 20 November 2014, available at:
https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1644569/end-occupationhong-kong-and-focus-mass-electoral-campaign, accessed 11 April 2019 (referring to
Professor Kin-man Chan).
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com/2014/12/03/world/asia/hong-kong-protests.html, accessed 11 April 2019.
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showed support was up in October, but opposition to the movement
exceeded support for it by November. Figure 3, below, shows the
proportion of respondents that supported and opposed the movement
over those three months.
Figure 3. Survey Results from Chinese University of Hong Kong121

Figure 3 shows that in September, support for Occupy Central was
modest and opposition was fairly strong. By mid-October, however,
the support for the movement was greater than the opposition. By
November, those gains had mostly been lost, and the trend was likely
downward. The survey was conducted November 5-11,122 prior to the
attack on the building housing the Legislative Council, an event that
likely eroded public support even more. By the time the courts had
issued orders for the occupation to end, it was clear that the costs of the
movement were outstripping its potential benefits, and this was evident
The data for this figure came from a press release from the Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey of The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 16
November 2014, available at: http://www.com.cuhk.edu.hk/ccpos/images/news/
TaskForce20141116-e.pdf, accessed 11 April 2019, p.7. The following categories
were combined: Strongly support and Quite support for Support, Strong not support
and Quite not support for Oppose, and So-so and No Opinion/Refuse to answer for
Neutral/no opinion.
122
Ibid.
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to many in the movement. By late November, half of protesters were
ready to retreat if asked by the student organizations involved in the
movement.123 Thus, concerns about the impact on the community, along
with concerns about efficacy and the safety and comfort of protestors,
brought the movement to an end.
V. CONCLUSION
Occupy Central was a remarkable social movement. While its
implications will continue to be studied and debated, it provides an
example of a large number of people exercising their rights to freedom
of expression and freedom of association in a society with Asian cultural
characteristics. While the exercise of these freedoms is consistent with
protection of fundamental rights expected from a society committed
to the rule of law, the particulars of the movement in Hong Kong were
also consistent with Asian cultural commitment to the community. The
motivation for the movement was to promote the community’s ability to
nominate candidates for the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, not to protect
individual freedoms. The manner in which the protesters exercised their
rights also reflected a concern for the rights of the community. While
the occupation caused traffic problems and other inconveniences, the
movement worked to reduce or eliminate the negative impact to the
community. The protesters directed traffic, cleaned up after themselves,
and made arrangements to keep the peace. After 79 remarkable days of
occupation, and in the face of court orders to disband the occupation, it
became clear that the costs to the community and to the protesters were
too great, and that it was time to retreat and work within the community.
That was a significant factor in the decision to retreat. In the aftermath
of the movement, its organizers have been convicted of inciting a public
nuisance because the court determined that the inconvenience to the
public outweighed the rights of the protesters to exercise their freedom
through the occupation.
This concern about the community was consistent with Hong
Jeffie Lam & Alan Yu, “Half of Occupy Central protestors ready to pack it in if
asked by organisers”, South China Morning Post, 20 November 2014, available at:
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1644902/half-occupy-central-protesters-ready-pack-it-if-asked-organisers, accessed 11 April 11, 2019.
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Kong’s cultural commitment to the interests of the community as
measured by Hofstede’s Individualism score. Hong Kong’s score of 25
for Individualism is similar to other Asian countries and much lower
than countries in Europe-North America. This shows that Hong Kong’s
culture, compared to cultures in Europe-North America, puts a higher
value on community interests and a lower value on individual interests.
This Asian commitment to the community as compared to individuals
is reflected in the fundamental rights scores of Asian countries in the
World Justice Project Rule of Law Index. Although Hong Kong in
many respects resembles European and North American countries in
its commitment to rule of law, its scores for fundamental rights, and
for freedom of expression and freedom of association, are significantly
lower. This is true for other countries in Asia as well. Japan has the
highest overall score in Asia on the Rule of Law Index (excluding
Australia and New Zealand as being culturally distinct), but its score
on Fundamental Rights, a respectable 0.78, is still substantially lower
than about half of the Europe-North America countries. In light of the
Asian cultural commitment to community interests, which is reflected
in Occupy Central narrative, it seems unlikely that Asian countries
will never earn scores among the highest for fundamental rights on the
World Justice Project Rule of Law Index. This conclusion is not meant
to be a criticism; ultimately, each culture must strike a balance between
individual and community interests. While the World Justice Project
may emphasize the importance of protection of certain individual rights,
that may be a reflection of the values of those involved in developing
the measures rather than a universal consensus.
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Appendix 1. Individualism Correlated Freedom of Expression,
Freedom of Association and Fundamental Rights 124
Europe-North America (including Australia and New Zealand)

Country

US
Australia
UK
Netherlands
Canada
Hungary
New Zealand
Italy
Belgium
Denmark
Swedan
France
Norway
Germany
Finland
Estonia
Poland
Czech Repub
Austria
Spain
Greece
Croatia
Romania
Bulgaria
Portugal
Slovenia

Individualism

Expression

Association

Fundamental
Rights

91
90
89
80
80
80
79
76
75
74
71
71
69
67
63
60
60
58
55
51
35
33
30
30
27
27

0.81
0.8
0.85
0.84
0.86
0.48
0.83
0.69
0.81
0.96
0.85
0.73
0.93
0.85
0.91
0.8
0.62
0.74
0.8
0.72
0.69
0.64
0.68
0.61
0.81
0.55

0.83
0.82
0.89
0.86
0.88
0.48
0.83
0.79
0.86
0.98
0.88
0.82
0.94
0.9
0.93
0.84
0.63
0.79
0.82
0.82
0.76
0.75
0.67
0.67
0.86
0.55

0.72
0.79
0.81
0.84
0.83
0.58
0.8
0.73
0.84
0.9
0.86
0.74
0.88
0.85
0.92
0.83
0.66
0.78
0.84
0.78
0.66
0.65
0.7
0.6
0.79
0.73

Correlation with Individualism: Europe-N.Am.

0.453418392

0.392863997

0.377158795

t value E-NA

2.439721299

2.048843561

1.953023545

p value E-NA

0.02213121

0.051112294

0.062097292

Data for the Appendix comes from the Geert Hofstede website and from the World
Justice Project. For the Geert Hofstede data on Individualism, see note 47. For the
World Justice Project data, see note 33. Correlations, t values and p values were calculated using formulae in an excel spreadsheet.
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East Asia and the Pacific (excluding Australia and New Zealand)

Individualism

Expression

Association

Fundamental
Rights

Japan

46

0.72

0.73

0.78

Philippines

32

0.56

0.57

0.42

Malaysia

26

0.46

0.44

0.48

Hong Kong

25

0.57

0.62

0.66

Singapore

20

0.5

0.49

0.69

Thailand

20

0.52

0.46

0.48

China

20

0.12

0.17

0.32

South Korea

18

0.65

0.69

0.74

Indonesia

14

0.67

0.66

0.52

Cambodia

NA

0.31

0.41

0.35

Mongolia

NA

0.63

0.68

0.58

Myanmar

NA

0.4

0.35

0.31

0.639902409

0.64075847

0.613405491

t value all

4.783564182

4.794416177

4.461747852

p value all

3.48569E-05

3.37645E-05

8.92216E-05

Country

Correlation with Individualism: All

Correlation with Individualism: Asia

0.297269048

0.320331396

0.307092647

t value Asia

0.823738081

0.894660879

0.853744006

p value Asia

0.437250083

0.400683059

0.421498309
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